We model systemic risk by including a common factor exposure to market-wide shocks and an exposure to tail dependence effects arising from linkages among extreme stock returns. Specifically our model allows for the firm-specific impact of infrequent and extreme events. When a jump occurs, its impact is in the same direction for all firms (either positive or negative), but its size and volatility are firm-specific. Based on the model we compute three measures of systemic risk: DD, NoD and ESR. Empirical results using data on the four sectors of the U.S. financial industry from 1996 to 2011 suggest that simultaneous extreme negative movements across large financial institutions are stronger in bear markets than in bull markets.
Introduction
A number of published studies document that the stability of the financial system as a whole is crucial not only to the financial industry itself but also to the real economy. Importantly, monitoring of the whole financial system (and not just the banking industry) is needed to guarantee its soundness. As the 2007-2012 crises (corporate and sovereign) have highlighted a key factor affecting the stability of the financial system and consequently the real economy is the level of systemic risk.
Therefore, the accurate measurement of this level is of crucial importance for regulators and investors alike.
As a consequence of this fact, a large literature has explored many systemic risk measures; see for instance Bisias, Flood, Lo, and Valavanis (2012) . The measures are usually defined either at the aggregate system level or at the individual-firm level. In the latter case, systemic risk can be thought as driven by both a common-factor exposure to market-wide shocks and additional exposures to other factors, observed and unobserved. No doubt, higher exposures to the common factor result in a higher probability of joint failures in the system, leading to a higher level of systemic risk.
However a common factor only can account for the systematic component of systemic risk (Das and Uppal, 2004) , but cannot capture the correlation stemming from large and infrequent changes (e.g. the unexpected failure of a major bank). In this vein a promising approach suggesting the relevance of tail dependence effects arising from exposure to unobservable covariates is outlined in Das, Duffie, Kapadia, and Saita (2007) . In a tail dependence setting, the arrival of (bad) news about one firm (extreme negative stock returns) causes a jump in the conditional distribution of hidden covariates, and therefore a (negative) jump in the stock returns of any other firms whose stock returns depend on the same unobservable covariates. In fact some recent papers give support to the role of the tail dependence effects exposure providing extra 3 explanatory power to the phenomenon of joint defaults in addition to the impact of the exposure to the common factor.
1 Therefore, the case for considering both components (common factor and tail dependence effects) of systemic risk seems compelling, yet it has received scarce attention until now. In fact, there are no studies, as far as we know, approaching the modeling of systemic risk with exposures to a common factor and to a tail dependence effects factor using a structural-form approach. Our paper is a first attempt to fill this gap in the literature.
Specifically we add a correlated jumps factor (our proxy for tail dependence effects) into the standard Merton (1974) framework. In doing that, we are able to model tail dependence effects by means of the correlation of tail risks arising from stock returns' extreme negative co-movements. Our model allows for the firm-specific impact of infrequent and extreme events. When a jump occurs, its impact is in the same direction for all firms (either positive or negative), but its size and volatility are firm-specific. Additionally, we refine the methodology proposed by Das and Uppal (2004) to capture joint tail risk behavior over time. 2 We consider the financial industry to be composed of different sectors (Commercial Banks, Brokers-Dealers, Insurance Companies, and Others) and study the systemic risk measures within each sector. Based on our model, we develop three indicators of systemic stress in the financial industry: (1) DD, the average distance-to-default within a given sector; (2) NoD, the number of joint defaults in a given sector; and (3) 1 For example, Giesecke and Kim (2011) provide strong evidence for risk increases in the U.S. financial system, after controlling for the exposure of firms to observable risk factors for the period from 1998 to 2009. Moreover, Jorion and Zhang (2009) state that large financial firms have deeper networks of creditors, illustrating that the failure of a large financial institution can cause ripple effects throughout the economy (e.g., Lehman Brothers). Das et al. (2007) observe that traditional credit risk models, where correlations are only induced by common factors, do not fully capture the clustering in default correlations. Default times tend to concentrate in some periods of time in which the probability of default of all firms is increased and which cannot be totally, or even partially, explained by the firms' common dependence on some macroeconomic factors (Giesecke (2004) , Giesecke and Goldberg (2004) , Elsinger et al. (2006a,b) ). 2 The behavior of joint tail risk is identified by the intensity of correlated jumps and firm-specific jump size.
ESR, the ratio of the aggregate expected shortfall to the aggregate asset value in a given sector.
In the empirical application, we employ stock market data because of its leading role in the price discovery process as exemplified by anticipating trends in subsequent failures (Lehar, 2005) or changes in supervisory ratings four quarters in advance (Krainer and Lopez, 2001 ) and among other evidence. 3 Specifically we focus on the U.S. financial industry and on the stock returns of the ten largest institutions within its four major sectors: Depositories, Broker-Dealers, Insurance Companies, and Others.
The basic reason of concentrating on the biggest firms is their crucial contribution to systemic risk. 4 The sample spans from January 1996 to December 2011. The ten largest institutions in each sector are not the same over time and therefore our sample We further analyze whether our systemic risk measures are leading indicators of alternative measures based on a model including only common factor effects, or a measure based on a public financial stress index, the St. Louis Fed Financial Stress 3 A number of papers support the idea of equity market information leading the credit risk price discovery process. Cifuentes, Ferrucci, and Shin (2005) claim that the stock returns are likely to be strongly negative before bad credit events. Zhang, Zhou, and Zhu (2009) observe that credit default swaps are sensitive to jumps on equity returns. Forte and Peña (2009) document that the equity market leads both the CDS and bond market in the price discovery process. 4 For example, Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010) show that the top six, in terms of contribution of each firm's systemic risk, are also in the top seven in terms of total assets. Recent studies support size as the major indicator of systemic importance, e.g., Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) . Furthermore the recent evidence also shows that daily stock return correlations among large financial institutions track the level of systemic risk (Patro, Qi, and Sun, 2012 Zhou (2001) , the traditional jump-diffusion model only allows for individual-firm jumps both in their arrival time and in their size. Our model instead assumes that the arrival time of jumps is coincident across all firms and, conditional on a jump, the jump size and its volatility is firm-specific. In doing so, we can model tail dependence effects arising from common exposures to extreme events. An especially interesting example is the unexpected failure of a major firm operating in a given sector. Third, we refine the Balla, Ergen, and Migueis (2012) extreme dependence-based measure of systemic risk by using a more robust statistical methodology. 6 Our study extends the results in Acharya et al. (2010) who present an expected-shortfall-based model and the CoVaR of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) . 7 Our study is also related with Giesecke and Kim's (2011) model, which is based on a reduced-form framework which captures the influence of market-wide and sector-specific risk factors, and of 5 Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003) argue that one would expect large negative returns to be more influential in a way that small negative returns are not, and extreme dependence is hidden in traditional correlation measures by the large number of days when small shocks happen. 6 Balla, Ergen, and Migueis (2012) apply extreme value theory and study only the U.S. banking sector whereas we include co-jumps in the Merton Model. Our empirical application is also more comprehensive. 7 Specifically, they define an institution's contribution to systemic risk as the difference between the CoVaR conditional on the institution's being in distress and the CoVaR at the median state of the institution.
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spillover effects. However we take a structural-form approach, and consider two effects (common factor and tail dependence) to characterize their three factors. The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the structural-form model with both common factor and tail dependence effects terms. Section 3 presents the methodology and the systemic risk measures. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 reports the empirical analysis. Some robustness tests are provided in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
The Merton Model with Co-Jumps

Asset returns with a common factor and co-jumps
This paper is part of an emerging literature positing bottom-up models of default correlations based on modeling the asset value of an individual financial institution as 7 being exposed to an observable common factor, tail dependence effects and an unobservable individual factor. Our model is closely related to Suh's (2012) , where the common factor is featured by a GARCH process and added into the pure-diffusion asset returns process.
We extend the specification of his model by incorporating co-jumps that occur across individual stocks. This is our proxy for tail dependence effects. In order to capture the correlated nature of these jumps, we impose two restrictions. One, the jump is assumed to arrive at the same time across all firms; two, conditional on the jump moving in a given direction (i.e. positive or negative), the jump's size and volatility are assumed to be firm-specific. The two features of the data that we wish our model to capture are (1) correlation between stock returns and a common factor, and (2) infrequent but large changes in stock returns through a jump component.
Let V j,t and S j,t be the firm j's asset value and stock price, respectively, at time t.
V j,t is not observable, but can be implied from S j,t on the basis of structure of Merton's model. Let X t , be the common factor. We consider a discrete-time economy for a period of [0,T] where trading takes place at any of the n+1 trading points 0, Δt, 2Δt,…,nΔt where T t n  . We denote the process of the logarithm of asset return
The j  , t 
Poisson random sum of normal random variables. That is,
where For the dynamics of the common factor, we employ a GARCH-type model.
Specifically, following Heston and Nandi (2000), the common factor is, under the physical measure P, modeled as . The derivation is provided in Appendix A1.
Structural-form model with factor-jump-diffusion process
We define equity S under the risk-neutral measure (RN) as a call option with maturity T as follows: (2000) show that under the RN measure, we have:
Heston and Nandi (2000) derive the following conditional generating function of the future common factor:
where the coefficients are recursively determined as follows:
Utilizing these facts, we derive the conditional generating function for asset values.
First, we note that under the RN measure, 
11 Bates (1991) shows that that the difference between risk-neutral parameters and true parameters of Then, we can write:
Therefore, we can derive the conditional generating function for asset values:
where
. See Appendix A2 for details. From the assumption that equity is valued as a European call option, we have the equity valuation formula: 
Estimation
Parameter estimation proceeds in three steps. First, we estimate the common factor parameters   , , ,     in the system of (5) and (6) 14 Third, we make two assumptions for the estimation of the parameters related to the asset return process of individual institutions. We assume that the maturity of the implied call option is one year in line with previous literature (e.g., Ronn and Verma (1986) , Lehar (2005) , and Suh (2012)).
We use the sum of a half of the long-term debt plus the short-term debt as a proxy for the debt amount , jt D within the assumed maturity of 1 year in accordance with 13 This is different from approaches in Suh (2012) and Lehar (2005) , where the former features the correlation of individual factors based on diagonal-VECH, while the later uses an exponentially-weighted moving average scheme. We claim that DCC is a better model in measuring asset correlations. First, many papers adopt DCC rather than other types of multivariate volatility process models. For example, the DCC method is superior to historical measures in that the correlation output refers to conditional rather than backward-looking correlation measures (Huang, Zhou, and Zhu, 2012 . And second, other advantage of using the DCC method is that it allows the correlation matrix to be heterogeneous, i.e., the pair wise correlation coefficients can be different for each pair of firms. 14 Specifically, the correlated jump intensity is derived from stock market information. As in Das and Uppal (2004), we assume a jump-diffusion process for the stock return process, and we estimate the parameters by minimizing the Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) of two metrics based on co-skewness and excess kurtosis.
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KMV's methodology. To be consistent with the literature (Duan (1994) and Duan (2000)) 15 we use historical returns to estimate the parameters. , we derive the following log likelihood function as follows
, 11 log | , , log 2 log log log 22
Re 2 Re . 
Methodology and Systemic Risk Measures
In the following section, we take the model that only accounts for the exposure to the common factor as the benchmark model. In fact, our model nests the benchmark model when λ=0. We compute risk indicators both based on our model and the benchmark model. The methodological procedure follows.
Monte Carlo Simulation
We employ Monte Carlo Simulation because no analytical solution is available for the systemic risk measures over a multi-period time horizon. We draw standard normal random variables and then simulate a hypothetical future common factor realization according to (5). Next we generate the random variable of co-jumps by drawing from normal random variables with a pre-specified mean and standard deviation of firms' jump magnitudes, and a Poisson random variable with the pre-specified intensity λ. Finally we draw multivariate normal random variables as specified by (20) and repeat the process 10,000 times.
Rolling windows
A rolling window approach is applied to study the extent to which systemic risk measures vary over time and to avoid the problem of look-ahead bias. To study this,
we use a one-year rolling window updated every month. Specifically, we construct a subsample for month t, in which the information during months t, t-1,t-2,…,t-11 is used. Then we repeat the calculation for month t+1, rolling the sample one month forward. For example, the first subsample corresponding to December 1996 contains data from January 1996 to December 1996. Then, the sample is updated by including the following month and discarding the first one. In the previous example, the second subsample corresponds to January 1997 and contains data from February 1996 to January 1997. We chose the monthly updating frequency to balance accuracy with computational burden.
Systemic risk measures
Not surprisingly, the literature has proposed a plethora of measures of systemic risks (see Rodriguez-Moreno and Peña (2013) (1) DD: the average distance-to-default in a given sector over a fixed time-horizon
The DD has been used as proxy for identifying a financial sector's stability. positive link between this measure and real output growth, especially during the periods of instability, and the latter suggests that DD is a leading indicator of real economic activity (e.g., bank lending standards and terms).
We compute the DD measure using our structural-form model with and without jump effects. In line with the Merton's DD framework, the DD is built as the logarithm of asset value minus the logarithm of debt value, and then divided by the standard deviation of this difference. Formally,
where V T and D T are time T asset's market value and debt's face value respectively.
To be specific, at a given time point t and for every firm j in a given sector, we compute daily simulated asset values for the next six months, generated by Monte Carlo simulation. Then we average the difference between log-asset value and log-debt value, and we use this as the numerator and then we take the standard deviation of this difference as the denominator. We then compute the average sector value as the weighted-average of all firms in a given sector, weights based on asset size. 16 We expect that the lower the DD measure, the higher the level of systemic risk.
(2) NoD: the number of simultaneous defaults in a given sector over a fixed time-horizon.
The rationale of this measure is that if there is a significant number of financial firms default at the same time, the whole financial system (through asset-fire sale or/and network contagion), can be severely affected (Lehar, 2005) . A financial institution is assumed to be in default if the market value of its assets falls below of its debt's face value within the next six months. To be specific, at a given time point t and for every firm j in a given sector, we compute daily simulated asset values for the next six months, generated by Monte Carlo simulation. Then we compare firm j asset value against its debt's face. If the latter is higher than the former we assume the firm j to be in default. We then compute the number of defaulted firms for each sector. We expect that the larger the NoD, the higher the level of systemic risk.
(3) ESR: the ratio of the aggregate present value of expected shortfalls to the aggregate asset value in a given sector over a fixed time-horizon.
This systemic risk measure proposed by Huang, Zhou, and Zhu (2009), is associated with the idea of assessing the systemic risk of the financial sector by computing the price of the government's contingent insurance against large default losses in the financial sector. Based on our structural-form model, we consider the amount of financial institutions' debt that cannot be covered by themselves as proxy for this insurance, and name it expected shortfall. The rationale is that, if all the financial institutions' debt is guaranteed by governments, they must pay to the creditors the difference between the face value of debts and the market value of financial institutions' assets.
Following Lehar (2005) , the present value of expected shortfall could be regarded as the put option value. In our framework, we compute it by Monte Carlo simulation as we have described before. Formally, we compute the present value of expected shortfalls, V is the market value of the firm's assets at time T. Moreover, we consider the sector-wide distress as the ratio of the sector's present values of expected shortfalls to the sector's total asset value over the next six months. We call this risk measure ESR, and compute it by using the formula of
. Intuitively, we would expect that the higher the ESR the higher the systemic risk level.
In summary, the indicators rely on intuitive economic interpretations, and we use them to illustrate the temporal trend of the overall systemic risk level. In particular, DD, NoD, and ESR are attractive because they summarize key determinants of systemic risk (firms' size, firms' leverage, the dependence between firms and the whole market) as suggested in Acharya et al. (2010) 
Data
Sample Selection
Our methodology is applied to the sample that comprises large financial institutions in the U.S. financial industry between January 1996 and December 2011.
We choose firms with available daily equity prices and quarterly balance sheet information in the CRSP and COMPUSTAT database. 18 We lag all accounting information by 3 months because of reporting delay and substitute missing accounting data with the most recent observation prior to it. The quarterly accounting data is linearly interpolated between quarterly reporting dates at daily frequency. Firms are categorized into four groups according to Acharya et al. (2010) and Brownlees and Engle (2011) including: Depositories, Brokers-Dealers, Insurance Companies, and
Others. 19 We use daily equity returns given that jumps probably appear more clearly in high frequency data. 20 We select the biggest firms based on their book value of total assets at the starting date of each estimation sample for each sector at a given time. Furthermore, the sample only contains firms continuously listed in a prior year to ensure a perfect match to the number of observations at firm-level as well as at system-level. To avoid survivorship bias, merged or bankrupt entities are also included in the sample as long as their equity and balance sheet information are available. Our sample contains 25, 24, 22, and 31 firms for Depositories, Broker-Dealers, Insurance Companies, and Others, respectively.
Monthly-interval observations
By moving the estimation window month by month, we have time-varying estimated parameters and risk measures at the end of each month from December 1996 to December 2011. This sample contains 181 monthly observations for each parameter and measure. Appendix B provides descriptions of the firms we use in the empirical application. We compute SIZE and LVG (leverage), both at firm-level and sector-level, at time t, where the former is the logarithm of the book value of total assets (at firm-level), and the logarithm of the summation of all firms in a sector (at sector-level); the latter is the quasi-market value of asset divided by market value of equity (at firm-level), and the weighted average leverage (at sector-level), weights are based on the values of market equity.
21 Figure 1 shows the annual returns across sectors as well as for the CRSP value-weighted index, which is used to capture the common factor in this paper. The sector-level annual return ending at month t for sector k is calculated by using the formula of , where is the firm j's annual return, and is the weight based on market equity for firm j at the end of month t. and Others (0.32). We classify risk measures by using the sub index "ben" for the benchmark-based measures (accounting for common factor only). Measures without sub index are based in the full model (common factor plus tail dependence effects).
The DD (DD ben ) indicates that the distance to default over the next six months, and thus the lower the DD the higher the sector's systemic risk. This measure for the 
Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis is designed to explore the effect of combining two factors (common factor and tail dependence effects) on measuring systemic risk. First, this section documents the estimation results of co-jumps and of structural-form models.
In the next section, we present a preliminary comparison between the full-model based measures and the benchmark-based ones. Then, we test whether our full-model based systemic risk measures are leading indicators of benchmark-based ones and of the STLFSI.
Estimation results
Tail dependence parameters
To characterize the sector-level behavior of the tail dependence effects proxied by the correlated jumps, we average firm-specific estimates into one single measure for the mean and the volatility of the size of co-jump by sector, and denote them as mu_coj and std_coj. By means of the rolling window approach, we compute time Overall, across sectors, we find that the intensity of co-jumps began to increase before the subprime loan crisis of 2007, reached its peak by the Lehman's failure, then decreased and increased again in mid-2011, in coincidence with the Eurozone crisis.
Overall, the evidence suggests that the probability of simultaneous jumps is higher during crisis times.
Regarding the average jump size mu_coj, it is close to zero through the whole sample period for Insurance Companies. However this is not the case in other sectors.
Negative jumps appear around Lehman's bankruptcy, in Broker-Dealers, Others , and 22 For instance in the case of parameter λ , we estimate it for a group of ten largest FIs in each sector using data from January 1996 to December 1996, and we assign the value λ calculated in this way to December 1996. Then, the procedure is repeated using data from February 1996 to January 1997 and the value of λ is assigned to January 1997 and so on. Broker-Dealers, Insurance Companies, and Others. Overall there are significant differences between the Pre-Crisis and Crisis periods across all groups. As expected, the intensity, and the volatility of co-jumps are higher in the Crisis period and the mean of co-jumps is strongly negative in the crisis period.
[Insert Table 2 Here]
It is worth noting that the Others sector always presents the highest λ. When concentrating on the crisis period, it also has highest value of std_coj (0.13) compared with other sectors (0.08), and has the lowest mu_coj (-0. 
Common factor parameters
The parameters of the common factor component (benchmark model) are μ, δ, and ξ, which capture the long run mean of asset returns, the exposure to the common factor, and the variance of idiosyncratic factor, respectively. We again average firm-level estimates into sector-level variables. To distinguish estimates of the full model from those of the benchmark-based model, we use notations of μ_ ben , δ_ ben , ξ_ ben , for the latter. Table 3 reports estimates by sector, and results of mean tests 25 between estimates derived from the full model and from the benchmark. There are some things worth mentioning. First we observe that both δ and ξ are significantly lower than δ_ ben, and ξ_ ben (see Column 3, 6, and 9 of Table 3 ). The result is not unexpected since, by construction, the term of co-jumps should capture some contributions of asset returns from the common factor and from the idiosyncratic factor. Therefore a decrease in the magnitudes of δ and ξ compared with the benchmark model is likely. Furthermore we find that Insurance Companies has the highest exposure to the common factor (0.72), followed by Broker-Dealers (0.59),
whereas Others have the lower exposure (0.35).
[Insert Table 3 Here]
Systemic risk measures : Preliminary analysis
This section outlines the stylized facts of the three alternative systemic risk 
DD (distance to default)
The DD indicates on average how far a firm's asset value would exceed its default point for a given sector, and thus conversely to conventional risk measures, the lower the DD the higher the sector's systemic risk. The DD series are in Panel A of Figure 3 . Tail dependence effects are of material importance when the red line is below the blue line. This is usually the case in all sectors.
Not surprisingly, we find that the tail dependence effects reduce the distance to default during and/or prior to bad economic events. 
NoD (number of defaults)
The NoD accounts for the number of defaults among the ten biggest financial institutions for a given sector. This measure is in Panel B of Summing up, this measure again indicates that risks in the financial industry increases through the channel of tail dependence in equity market especially in bad times.
ESR (expected shortfall ratio)
The Panel C of Figure 3 reports the time variation of ESR, in which financial distress is defined as the ratio of the sector's expected shortfalls to the its aggregate asset value. Tail dependence effects are of material importance when the red line is above the blue line. This is usually the case in all sectors.
The ESR measure displays stronger effects of the tail dependence component in recent crisis. For instance, in the Broker-Dealers sector, the NoD measure gives a similar level of systemic risk in the cases of the LTCM debacle and in the Lehman's bankruptcy (6 out of 10 defaulting firms), whereas ESR signals a higher level of systemic risk in the case of the latter event (200) proposed by Kliesen and Smith (2010) . 28, 29 The index is publicly available, and is based on a principal components analysis of a broad range of financial prices and rates from many different financial markets. 29 We use monthly STLFSI, although the highest frequency is weekly, in order to match the data interval used in this paper.
Granger Causality test
Given that unit roots test for our variables give conflicting results, 30 we present Granger Causality (GC) tests on both levels and first differences. The results are in Panel A and B of Table 4 for the former and for the later respectively. All tests are implemented with optimally chosen lags and are corrected after controlling for heteroskedastic and correlated errors. When using first difference data series (Panel B of Table 4 ), FM-based measures lead (usually by one or two months) benchmark-based ones in eight cases out of 30 We employed several unit root tests, including Augmented Dickey-Fuller, GLS Dickey-Fuller, and Perron (1997) with structural breaks in the mean, in the trend and in both elements simultaneously. Detailed results are available on request. 31 The optimal number of lags has been chosen using the Schwarz (BIC) criterion. [Insert Table 4 Here]
QA test
In addition to test the forecasting power over the whole sample period, it is also interesting to explore whether our measures are capable of identifying earlier warning Table 5 ). It reminds us that using solely public financial stress index is not enough to provide warning flags for crises. In comparison with benchmark-based measures, results also document that our measures 32 shows earlier breakpoints across sectors, by 16, 7, 1, and 4 months for Depositories, Broker-Dealers, Insurance Companies, and Others. As for other two risk indicators (NoD and ESR), the break dates identified by our measures always lead to those by the benchmark and STLFSI especially when we use information from sectors of Broker-Dealers or Insurance Companies. This result suggests that considering tail dependence effects other than common factor does provide extra power of forecasting upcoming distress, and the information within Broker-Dealers are more useful to forecast financial distress.
As for the level test (Panel B of Table 5 ), we still find stronger evidence that our measures lead (concur) to benchmark-based ones by 8 out of 12 cases (2 out of 12 cases), where our DD measures always lead to the benchmark across sectors. In terms of the lead-lag relationship between our measures and STLFSI, we find the DD measure on Broker-Dealers is the best one by leading the public index up to 4 months.
Overall the results provided here point out that our DD measures are the best risk indicators. Among different financial sectors, the information from Broker-Dealers is mostly useful in forecasting future financial distress. Our measures behavior as the leading indicator to the public financial stress index, and should be able to serve as early detection of vulnerabilities in the financial system, is useful for regulators by earning extra time to prepare contingency plans.
[Insert Table 5 Here]
Robustness Test
We consider two robustness checks for predictive analysis, including (1) changing trimming criteria on breakpoint tests; and (2) applying for alternative breakpoint test methodology. 
The 30% trimming criterion on breakpoint test
We concern that under 25% trimming, the test sample covers part of post-crisis period (the first half year of 2009) and could still give breakpoints as crisis is about to be ended, instead of the ones as crisis is just starting. Since our aim is to investigate whether our measures are capable of providing early warning signals, in a more conservative way, we use 30% trimming percentage, where the test sample is ended at December 2008. The results are documented in Table 6 . For level test, results are completely the same as previous evidence. For persistence test, there are changes for some cases, but overall it still gives support that our measures lead to benchmark-based measures and our best DD measures leads STLFSI by up to three years.
[Insert Table 6 Here]
Bai and Perron breakpoint test
We apply alternative methodology proposed by Perron (1998, 2003) to identify structural breaks. We re-examine breakpoints tests implemented in the main content (with 25% trimming percentage), and report in Table 7 In general our results are hardly changed. Specifically for the level test, all breakpoints are dated one month prior to those identified based on QA test, and thus lead-lag relationships are the same as before. For the persistence test, Bai and Perron test gives breakpoints two months prior to those identified by QA test across measures, and lead-lag relationships are almost the same as previous results.
[Insert Table 7 Here]
Conclusion
There is growing evidence suggesting that systemic risk has at least two main driving forces. On the one hand there is a common-factor exposure to market-wide shocks. On the other, there is a tail dependence effects factor arising from linkages among extreme stock returns. The way to model the relative importance of these two factors is a research topic of paramount importance. We contribute to this strand of the literature proposing a new structural-form model which includes both factors. In our 
Finally we assume all random variables appeared in asset-log-return process (Eq. (1)) are all independent. Therefore we can derive the variance of asset return as follows. The table reports average values of estimated parameters from our structural-form model and the benchmark model (along with the notation "ben"). The sample period spans from December 1996 to December 2011, containing 181 number of observations. The reported numbers in μ, μ_ ben , ξ, and ξ_ ben are 10000 times of raw numbers. The "diff." stands for the testing results of independent samples t-test where the null hypothesis is the means of the two groups are equal, for each pair of parameters. The column 3, 6, and 9 first report differences of average values of estimated parameters, along with P-value in brackets. We also analyze how our measures lead or lag to benchmark-based measures and to the STLFSI. They are deployed along with items of "Lead-Lag (vs. benchmark)" and "Lead-Lag (vs. STLFSI)". Furthermore, we use the positive sign of "+" (the negative sign "-") to indicate our measures lead (lag) to alternative measures, and the numbers nearby signs are their corresponding leading (lagged) numbers of months. Black boldface values represent that our measures are earlier than or concurrent with those from alternative measures. We also analyze how our measures lead or lag to benchmark-based measures and to the STLFSI. They are deployed along with items of "Lead-Lag (vs. benchmark)" and "Lead-Lag (vs. STLFSI)". Furthermore, we use the positive sign of "+" (the negative sign "-") to indicate our measures lead (lag) to alternative measures, and the numbers nearby signs are their corresponding leading (lagged) numbers of months. Black boldface values represent that our measures are earlier than or concurrent with those from alternative measures. We also analyze how our measures lead or lag to benchmark-based measures and to the STLFSI. They are deployed along with items of "Lead-Lag (vs. benchmark)" and "Lead-Lag (vs. STLFSI)". Furthermore, we use the positive sign of "+" (the negative sign "-") to indicate our measures lead (lag) to alternative measures, and the numbers nearby signs are their corresponding leading (lagged) numbers of months. Black boldface values represent that our measures are earlier than or concurrent with those from alternative measures. 
